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Abstract 
Central to the discursive project that accompanies the prosecution of the global war 
against terrorism is a powerful and ubiquitous narrative of threat and danger. A critical 
discourse analysis of this narrative reveals how the language and politics of fear work to 
construct counter-terrorism and reproduce hegemony. The principal discursive formations 
of the narrative include: the notion of a new form of ‗super-terrorism‘ or ‗catastrophic 
terrorism‘; the supreme emergency engendered by the terrorist threat; and the ubiquity of 
a highly dangerous enemy within. The primary ideological purpose behind constructing 
such a powerful narrative of threat and danger is to legitimise and normalise the doctrine 
of pre-emptive war against foreign enemies, and the simultaneous disciplining of 
domestic sources of opposition. The politics of fear also function to enforce national 
unity, (re)construct national identity, disguise the neo-conservative geo-strategic project, 
and strengthen the institutions of state coercion. However, upon closer examination it 
becomes clear that the discursive construction of the catastrophic terrorist threat is 
inherently unstable and susceptible to counter-hegemonic resistance across a range of 
levels. Ethically, we have a responsibility to resist the politics of fear because not only is 
it damaging to democratic politics, but it is directly implicated in the widespread human 
rights abuses of the war on terror seen in Guantànamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere.  
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________ 
*Author‘s note: The research for this paper derives largely but not solely from the 
author‘s forthcoming book – Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, 
Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
Introduction 
 
Central to the discursive project that accompanies the prosecution of the global war 
against terrorism is a powerful and ubiquitous narrative of threat and danger. In fact, the 
chief justification for the counter-terrorism effort both internationally and domestically 
rests on the constant articulation of the vast threat posed by international terrorism. 
Moreover, there is no doubting the power and pervasiveness of this discourse; the politics 
of fear have infused recent electoral contests in America, Australia, and Spain, and look 
set to dominate the forthcoming 2005 British general election. Disturbingly, majorities in 
America and Britain appear to accept that the extraordinary nature of the present terrorist 
threat justifies measures which would otherwise be viewed with abhorrence, such as 
preventive internment, the use of abusive interrogation methods on suspected terrorists, 
pre-emptive war, vast increases in military spending, and the suspension of habeas 
corpus. These attitudes are reflective of the extent to which the politics of fear have 
destabilised the moral community and bankrupted the moral vision of universal human 
rights and social inclusion in favour of a dubious sense of ‗national‘ security. 
 Apart from its constitution as the new prism though which both domestic and 
foreign policy is formulated, the discourse of threat and danger has also been normalised 
across virtually every aspect of social and political life. Polling data indicates that a 
majority of respondents believe that terrorism poses a genuine and ongoing risk to 
personal and public safety. Consequently, the reality of the threat posed by terrorism and 
the necessity of adjustment is now taken for granted in all forms of commercial travel, 
public gatherings like sporting and cultural events, banking, computing, policing, 
education, immigration, the media, and entertainment—to name a few. Even in the 
academy, there are relatively few scholars who do not accept that international terrorism 
is now the primary security threat facing western states.  
 Of course, security officials would argue that in the glow of the graphic images of 
bodies falling like leaves from the Twin Towers and the twisted metal of the Madrid train 
bombings, the widespread fear of terrorism is nothing more than commonsense. It is 
undeniable that such seemingly random violence, packaged as media spectacle, creates an 
initial shock that is difficult to transcend: 
 
The reporting of innocent travellers killed in the bombing of an airplane is so brutally 
factual that no possible explanation makes sense; indeed it is so ‗real‘ that it requires no 
frame, so ‗true‘ that no interpretation is necessary, so ‗concrete‘ that no meaning need be 
inferred. Its reality appears to belong more to nature than to society. This is discourse so 
over-whelmed by the ‗reality effect‘ of the facts that the very suggestion that it authenticate 
itself appears ridiculous.
1
 
 
In essence, the ‗reality effect‘ of terrorist violence induces a level of anxiety that no 
amount of rationalising can really hope to counteract; the violence appears to ‗speak for 
itself‘, the threat seems self-evident in the act.  
 However, the sheer visceral horror of terrorist attacks—even those like the 
September 11, 2001 attacks—are not, I would argue, sufficient in themselves to explain 
the scope and depth of the fear and anxiety that now pervades social and political life. 
After all, acts of political violence are nothing new; in addition, they are always publicly 
mediated, and the meanings of such events are continuously contested and prone to 
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alteration over time.
2
 More importantly, while there are ‗real‘ dangers in the world—
disease, accidents, and violence (among others) all have life and death consequences—, 
not all dangers are equal and not all risks are interpreted as dangers.
3
 The world contains 
a multiplicity of dangers (so many that we cannot even begin to know all that threatens 
us), but it is only those that are interpreted as threats that society learns to fear. 
Frequently, as the fear of terrorism illustrates, there is little correspondence between the 
socially accepted level of threat and the actual risk to individuals: on a statistical scale of 
risks for example, terrorism actually ranks somewhere around the risk of being killed in a 
DIY accident or being struck by lightening. In other words, the gap between society‘s 
perception of the risk of terrorism and the physical reality is created by a socially 
constructed ‗discourse of danger‘4 that normalises that fear. 
 There are both ontological and normative reasons why a critical analysis of the 
current discourse of danger is urgently called for. Ontologically, as a number of important 
works have reminded us,
5
 political reality is a social construct, manufactured through 
discursive practices and shared systems of meaning. Language does not simply reflect 
reality, it co-constitutes it. A fully informed understanding of the origins, consequences, 
and trajectory of the current war on terrorism therefore, would appear largely unattainable 
in the absence of a critical investigation of the official language of counter-terrorism. 
Normatively, the enactment of any large-scale project of political violence—such as war 
or counter-terrorism—requires a significant degree of political and social consensus and 
consensus is not possible without language. The process of inducing consent and 
normalising the practice of the war requires the construction of a whole new public 
discourse that manufactures approval while simultaneously suppressing individual doubts 
and wider political protest. More than this, power itself is a social phenomenon, 
constantly in need of legitimation; and language is the medium of legitimation.
6
 Thus, the 
deployment of language by politicians is an exercise of power and domination; such 
power must always be subjected to rigorous public interrogation and critical examination 
lest it become abusive. This is never truer than during times of national crisis when the 
authorities assume enhanced powers to deal with what are perceived to be extraordinary 
public threats.  
 The paper is divided into four parts. In the initial section, methodological issues 
relating to the study are briefly discussed. The second section forms the core of the 
investigation; it entails a critical discourse analysis of the primary narratives of threat and 
danger in the official language of the war on terrorism. The third section examines the 
politics of fear, and explains how the discursive construction of danger functions to 
construct counter-terrorist political violence and reify state power. The final section 
explores the possibilities for deconstruction and counter-hegemonic struggle. In the 
conclusion, I briefly reflect on the ethical imperatives of resisting the politics of fear. The 
overall argument of the paper is fairly simple: the threat of terrorism is a social and 
political construction that functions to normalise the war on terrorism while 
simultaneously reifying state power. At the same time however, the primary discursive 
constructions at the heart of the threat narrative are inherently unstable and vulnerable to 
deconstruction. Perhaps the most important argument I wish to make is this: the language 
of threat is directly implicated in the conspicuous human rights abuses of the war on 
terrorism. This implies that resistance to the politics of fear is now the ethical duty of all 
responsible people. 
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 The Analysis of Discourse 
 
The methodological approach I have employed to examine the language of threat and 
danger in the war on terrorism is known broadly as critical discourse analysis. This 
approach is at once both a technique for analysing specific texts or speech acts, and a way 
of understanding the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena. 
By engaging in concrete, linguistic textual analysis—that is, by doing systematic analyses 
of spoken and written language—critical discourse analysis aims to shed light on the 
links between texts and societal practices and structures, or, the linguistic-discursive 
dimension of social action.
7
  
 The approach is based on a number of crucial assumptions. It assumes that 
discourse is a form of social practice which both makes or constitutes the social world, 
and is at the same time constituted by other social practices. Discourses both contribute to 
the shaping of social structures and are also shaped by them; there is a dialectical 
relationship between the two. Of even greater import, critical discourse analysis assumes 
that discursive practices are never neutral, but rather they contribute to the creation and 
reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups. That is, discourses 
possess a clear ideological character; they are the construction and deployment of 
‗meaning in the service of power.‘8 Or, more specifically, discourses act as constructions 
of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations 
of domination in society.
9
 Thus, a central aim of critical discourse analysis lies in 
revealing the means by which language is deployed to maintain power. What makes 
critical discourse analysis ‗critical‘ is its normative commitment to positive social 
change. 
 In terms of studying the role and use of language, there are two levels at which 
critical discourse analysis functions. First, it engages directly with specific texts in an 
effort to discover how discursive practices operate linguistically within those texts. 
Second, because individual text analysis is not sufficient on its own to shed light on the 
relationship between discourse and social processes, critical discourse analysis adds a 
wider interdisciplinary perspective which combines textual and social analysis.
10
 In 
essence, critical discourse analysis involves carefully reading a specific text—such as a 
speech, interview, radio address or report—and subjecting it to a series of analytical 
questions: What assumptions, beliefs and values underlie the language in the text? How 
does the grammar, syntax and sentence construction reinforce the meanings and effects of 
the discursive constructions contained in the text? What are the histories and embedded 
meanings of the important words in the text? What patterns can be observed in the 
language, and how do different parts of the text relate to each other? What knowledge or 
practices are normalised by the language in the text? How does the language create, 
reinforce or challenge power relations in society? Finding answers to these questions 
goes some way towards understanding how discourses work to construct social processes 
and structures in ways that reproduce power relations. 
 In my analysis of the language of the ‗war on terrorism‘ I chose to focus mainly 
on the speeches, interviews and public addresses given by senior members of the Bush 
administration.
11
 I examined over 100 speeches, interviews, radio broadcasts and reports 
to Congress between September 11, 2001 and January 31, 2004; these texts were a 
representative sample of more than 6,000 such texts on the subject of America‘s ‗war on 
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terrorism‘ for that period. I began by examining all the important speeches that garnered 
major public attention or were of great symbolic importance, such as the September 11, 
2001 and September 20, 2001 addresses to the American people, the State of the Union 
addresses, and anniversary and commemorative speeches. Lastly, I tried to ensure a 
selection of different speakers, from the president to senior ambassadors, as well as texts 
from the entire period.  
 
Writing Threat and Danger
12
 
  
The overall discourse of the war on terrorism comprises a vast corpus of texts (speeches, 
laws, reports, policy documents, operating manuals, memos, letters, emails, and 
websites— among others), and draws on a great many assumptions, beliefs, myths, tropes 
and narratives. It also involves a great many discursive constructions, formations, and 
strategies; the war on terrorism is a vast and highly complex political and social 
discourse. In this respect, the following critical discourse analysis can only provide a 
brief survey of some of the primary means by which the official language of the war on 
terrorism seeks to normalize and institutionalize the Bush administration‘s construction 
of the terrorist threat; a more in-depth treatment of the overall discourse can be found 
elsewhere.
13
  
 The social and political construction of national threat has a long genealogy in 
American politics.
14
 For example, in the early days of settlement, government officials 
scripted the first of what would become a number of ‗red scares‘.15 In this narrative, 
Native Americans—‗red‘ Indians—threatened the spread of progressive civilisation along 
the western frontier; consequently, they had to be exterminated or quarantined 
(preventively detained) in reservations. A second ‗red scare‘ was invoked during the 
widespread industrial unrest that overtook American industry from the 1890s to the early 
1920s; in this case, the infamous 1919-20 Palmer Raids were used to arrest and deport 
thousands of foreigners suspected of being radicals. The most recent ‗red scare‘ began in 
the 1950s, when communism was constructed as a catastrophic threat to the American 
way of life. The McCarthy hearings epitomised the depth of the hysterical fear of the 
‗enemy within‘. In between the red scares, the two world wars allowed fears of the 
‗enemy living among us‘ to encompass people of German, Italian and Japanese 
extraction: ‗Loose Lips Sink Ships‘ was the Advertising Council‘s warning in the 
1940s.
16
 Since the end of the cold war, American officials have discursively constructed a 
series of new dangers: the threat of ‗rogue states‘ like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea, 
and Iraq; the threats posed by the illicit drug trade; and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. The discourse of the dangers of (Islamic) terrorism—what we may well 
call the ‗green scare‘—is only the latest in a long line of social fears and moral panics 
written by the authorities.  
 In fact, the present fear of terrorism did not begin on September 11, 2001; it began 
in the early 1980s when officials started to apply the term ‗terrorism‘ to acts of violence 
that they had previously labelled hijackings, bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and 
sabotage. As a result of this reclassification, it appeared there was a new plague of 
terrorist violence. The media quickly adopted the same language, and news stories about 
terrorism soon became a staple of television and print media news. The fear of 
spectacular terrorist atrocities also made its way into hundreds of movies, television 
  
6 
programmes and works of popular fiction: from Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre‘s 
The Fifth Horseman and Nelson DeMille‘s Cathedral, to movies like Black Sunday, the 
public was primed to expect sudden horrific death at the hands of crazed terrorists. Not 
surprisingly, by 1987 surveys in America revealed that 68-80 percent of the public 
regarded terrorism as a ‗serious‘ or ‗extreme‘ threat—despite only 17 deaths  attributable 
to terrorist activities that year.
17
 Today‘s anxiety therefore rests on decades of public fear 
that was deliberately encouraged by the authorities, and which is continually experienced 
in the virtual dangers seen in 24, Spooks, XXX, The Sum of All Fears, The Peacemaker, 
True Lies, and countless other movies, television programmes, and popular novels. 
Anthropologically speaking, terrorism has emerged as one of western society‘s strongest 
taboos; and the threatening terrorist is actually the cultural projection of the tabooed ‗wild 
man‘ figure of the western imagination.18 This then, is the context for the discursive 
construction of the terrorist threat at the heart of the war on terrorism. 
 In the official language of counter-terrorism, it is possible to identify three main 
rhetorical themes that discursively construct the terrorist threat: the notion of a new form 
of ‗super-terrorism‘ or ‗catastrophic terrorism‘; the supreme emergency engendered by 
the terrorist threat; and the ubiquity of a highly dangerous enemy that lurks within 
western society. For the sake of clarity, some words in the texts of official speeches have 
been highlighted to indicate the basis of claims and analyses. 
 
The ‘New’ Super-Terrorism 
 
The initial construction of the terrorist threat involved fixing the attacks of September 11, 
2001 as the start of a whole ‗new age of terror‘—the dawning of ‗a new era‘ of terrorist 
violence which contained ‗unprecedented dangers‘. Vice President Dick Cheney 
constructs a powerful image of the new age: ‗Today, we are not just looking at a new era 
in national security policy, we are actually living through it. The exact nature of the new 
dangers revealed themselves on September 11, 2001, with the murder of 3,000 innocent, 
unsuspecting men, women and children right here at home‘.19 John Ashcroft called it a 
new ‗reign of terror‘.20 What Cheney and Ashcroft are doing is attaching significance and 
meaning to the attacks that goes far beyond their physical and psychological impacts: 
these were not just acts of dissident violence; they were a dawning, a rupture in time. 
They were events of metaphysical proportions. This rhetorical association between the 
dawn of the new age and the threats posed by terrorists is deliberate and specifically 
designed to script a discourse of danger. Moreover, it is only possible by severing all 
links between this act of terrorism and the countless others preceding it—by 
decontextualising it from previous attacks. In a sense, ‗9/11‘ was discursively constructed 
without a pre-history and now stands alone as a defining act of cruelty and evil 
(‗infamy‘).  
 Related to their significance as the harbinger of a new age of terror, the discourse 
goes on to reconstruct them as the start of an era of ‗super-terrorism‘ or ‗catastrophic 
terrorism‘ where terrorists use weapons of mass destruction to try and kill not just 
thousands of innocent people, but millions. As Cheney contends, the threat of terrorism is 
supremely catastrophic: 
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The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next time 
terrorists strike, they may well […] direct chemical agents or diseases at our population, or 
attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities.  
 
[N]o rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such weapons of mass murder the 
moment they are able to do so.  
 
[W]e are dealing with terrorists […] who are willing to sacrifice their own lives in order to 
kill millions of others.‘21  
 
This language is clearly and unambiguously designed to generate maximum fear. The 
visions presented are apocalyptic, reflecting the most terrifying of Hollywood movies: the 
detonation of a nuclear bomb in a city, or the release of a deadly chemical or biological 
agent—resulting in millions dead (it is reflective of The Sum of All Fears, 12 Monkeys, or 
Outbreak). It is important to note how the discourse employs the vision of a city 
devastated by a nuclear attack, without openly acknowledging that the source of that 
vision is the only atomic attack on a city in history (Hiroshima)—committed by America 
itself. The language constructs a terrifying fear while consigning the source of the fear to 
historical amnesia. As if this is not enough to induce paralysing terror, Cheney then 
makes it seem a perfectly reasonable fear to have; any ‗rational person‘ should fear a 
terrorist-induced nuclear holocaust.  
 This construction of a new world of unimaginable violence (that also seems to 
echo biblical visions of the last days) is not a one-off example of over-zealous rhetoric; it 
is actually a common refrain among officials. For example, Paul Wolfowitz reinforces the 
normalcy of the vision when he states: ‗If they had the capability to kill millions of 
innocent civilians, do any of us believe they would hesitate to do so?‘22 The form of this 
language is a rhetorical challenge that traps the listener in its logic because the answer 
appears self-evident: after all, if terrorists were willing to kill thousands in the WTC 
attacks, then logically they would kill more than this if they could. The question and its 
context supply its own unequivocal answer and circumvent the emergence of any 
alternative possibilities. In this manner, it normalises the terror. Colin Powell then 
constructs the vision of a race against time: ‗Even as I speak, terrorists are planning 
appalling crimes and trying to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction‘.23 This 
lends an aura of inevitability to the danger: the plans are under way, only the means are 
missing. In this language we hear an echo of the popular terrorist movie script: the 
devilish plot is in motion and the heroes are racing against time to save the world. 
Importantly, this discourse appropriates and amplifies the academic discourse of ‗super-
terrorism‘ or ‗catastrophic terrorism‘ that was popular well before September 11, 2001.24 
A number of academics and so-called terrorism ‗experts‘ have warned of such attacks 
using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons for decades, and although the WTC 
attacks did not involve any weapons of mass destruction, it was still taken as a 
vindication of their warnings.  
 In a discursive variation, this threat of ‗super-terrorism‘ is from a very early stage 
conflated with and discursively linked to the threat of ‗weapons of mass destruction‘ and 
the ‗rogue states‘ who might give them to the terrorists. As Powell puts it, the threat lies 
in the ‗potentially catastrophic combination of a rogue regime, weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorists‘.25 This unholy trinity offers an even more terrifying spectre 
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than simply ‗super-terrorism‘: terrorists are no longer lone dissidents scattered across the 
world, instead, they have the resources and capabilities of rogue states with which to 
enact their evil purposes. One of the most powerful articulations of this construction 
comes in George W. Bush‘s State of the Union address where he first mentions the ‗axis 
of evil‘ (the embodiment of the alliance between terrorists and ‗rogue regimes‘): 
 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the 
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave 
and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred.  
 
Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by 
outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off 
without warning.  
 
I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and 
closer. The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to 
threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.26  
 
Bush begins by constructing an alliance between terrorists and certain regimes that 
appears natural and unquestionable. He states categorically that he knows that there are 
thousands of terrorists supported by ‗outlaw regimes‘ spread throughout the world and 
that terrorists and regimes are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction. This is 
simply a fact. Interestingly, and as if we wouldn‘t notice, by the end of the speech the 
initial terrorist element of the construction is left out and forgotten; what we are left with 
is ‗the world‘s most dangerous regimes‘ threatening to deploy ‗the world‘s most 
dangerous weapons‘. The logic of the language has brought us to exactly the place Bush 
intended: in order to deal with the threat of ‗catastrophic terrorism‘, we must act against 
‗rogue regimes‘—especially those identified as belonging to the ‗axis of evil‘.  
 The rhetorical strategy of making terrorists and ‗rogue states‘ synonymous is an 
ingenious discursive slight of hand. In the first instance, it allows America to re-target its 
military from a war against a tiny group of individual dissidents scattered across the 
globe (an unwinnable and unglamorous war) to a number of territorially defined states 
who also happen to be the target of American foreign policy designs. In effect, it 
transforms the war against terrorism from a largely hidden and unspectacular intelligence 
gathering and criminal apprehension programme, to a flag-waving public display of 
awesome military firepower that rebuilds the American military‘s dented self-confidence. 
Of greater concern, it simultaneously assists the pursuit of geo-strategic objectives in 
crucial regions such as the Middle East under the banner of counter-terrorism.
27
  
 
Constructing the Supreme Emergency 
 
In international law, the notion of ‗supreme emergency‘ denotes a situation where the 
very existence of the state is under threat; that is, where the national security, foreign 
policy and economy of the state is at risk. Under such circumstances, states are permitted 
to take any measures deemed necessary for their survival—including pre-emptive war, 
the suspension of constitutional rights, preventive detention, or any other extraordinary 
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measure. Thus, it gives a government immense power and freedom of action if they can 
construct their crisis as being so severe that it constitutes a ‗supreme emergency‘.  
 There is no question that the architects of the ‗war on terrorism‘ have discursively 
constructed the terrorist threat as constituting a ‗supreme emergency‘. Powell, for 
example, stated that terrorism was a ‗threat to civilization‘ and a ‗threat to the very 
essence of what you do‘.28 Bush often describes terrorism as a ‗threat to our way of life‘,29 
and a threat to ‗the peace of the world‘.30 The notion of a ‗threat to our way of life‘ is 
actually a well-worn cold war expression that serves two functions. First, it vastly inflates 
the danger and constructs the magnitude of the threat: instead of a tiny group of dissidents 
with resources that do not even begin to rival that of the world‘s smallest countries, it 
implies they are as powerful as the Soviet empire once was thought to be with its tens of 
thousands of nuclear missiles and its massive conventional army. Astonishingly, it 
implies the terrorists could do what the Soviet Union failed to achieve over 40 years of 
trying. Second, it discursively links the terrorist threat to a popular narrative in American 
politics, namely, the long struggle against international communism. During the cold war, 
one of the most common rhetorical refrains was that agents of communism—both within 
and without the American homeland—threatened ‗the American way of life‘.  
 The discourse also establishes the temporal dimensions of the threat. Ashcroft, for 
example, states that: ‗Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today‘.31 The 
phrase ‗clear and present danger‘ implies that it is obvious to everyone that a danger 
exists—it is ‗clear‘ to all who can see—and that it is ‗present‘, which could mean it is 
temporarily present (now), or spatially present (here). It is also an echo of the language 
used against communists during America‘s early ‗red scares‘. Emotionally, the phrase 
resonates powerfully because it echoes earlier moments of peril in the nation‘s history: 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War. It is also 
fixed in popular culture as the title of a Tom Clancy book and movie of the same name. 
As the language reverberates through our collective consciousness, we recognise that we 
are living through a moment of genuine peril. Cofer Black, Spokesman Coordinator for 
Counter-terrorism, expands the danger even further: ‗The threat of international terrorism 
knows no boundaries‘.32 This is the logical conclusion of the language: it is in fact, an 
infinite threat; it is a ‗super-supreme emergency‘. 
 An example of the way in which the threat is typically constructed in official 
speeches can be seen in President Bush‘s Press Conference on 11 October, 2001, exactly 
a month after the WTC attacks. In the process of one short speech and a Q & A with the 
press, Bush uses the word ‗threat‘ 14 times—in addition to references to ‗danger‘, 
‗weapons of mass destruction‘, ‗chemical weapons‘ and ‗biological weapons‘. More than 
simply trying to overwhelm the listener with the imminence of danger, the text is also 
notable for the use of specific rhetorical strategies. For example, in his opening statement 
Bush assures: ‗Americans tonight can know that while the threat is ongoing, we are 
taking every possible step to protect our country from danger. Your government is doing 
everything we can to recover from these attacks, and to try to prevent others.‘ This is a 
familiar discursive device in politics where the speaker simultaneously provokes and 
allays anxiety. This reinforcement of the threat followed by a comforting reassurance 
occurs numerous times. Then Bush reinforces the threat/reassurance rhetorical format by 
providing a concrete example of how the government received a threat and then acted 
strongly and appropriately to counter it: 
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And let me give you one example of a specific threat we received. […] We received 
knowledge that perhaps an al Qaeda operative was prepared to use a crop duster to spray a 
biological weapon or a chemical weapon on American people. And so we responded. We 
contacted every crop-dust location, airports from which crop dusters leave, we notified 
crop duster manufactures to a potential threat. We knew full well that in order for a crop 
duster to become a weapon of mass destruction would require a retrofitting, and so we 
talked to machine shops around where crop dusters are located. We took strong and 
appropriate action. And we will do so any time we receive a credible threat.  
 
Critically, in explaining how responsible and appropriate the government is being in 
protecting the American people from these ‗ongoing threats‘, Bush simultaneously 
ratchets up the level of fear by invoking an image of crop dusters (a symbol of rural life, 
quiet agriculture and the production life-giving nourishment) raining down biological and 
chemical weapons on the American people. It is a terrifying spectre: an instrument of 
progress, a life-affirming application of technology (and the opposite of a military plane, 
for example) transformed into a weapon of mass destruction. 
   These contradictions—creating terror and reassurance at the same time—are 
given even greater power by the symbolic act of hiding the Vice President in a secure 
bunker every time a threat is issued. A reporter questions Bush about it: 
  
Question: Mr. President, you‘ve tried very hard to assure Americans that the country is 
safe, and yet your own Vice President has spent most of this week in a secure location. Can 
you explain why that is, and also how long that will last? 
 
The President: […] We take very seriously the notion of the continuity of government. It‘s 
a responsibility we share, to make sure that under situations such as this, when there are 
possible threats facing our government, that we separate ourselves, for the sake of 
continuity of our government. 
 
In effect, the answer to the question is the production of even more fear: the government 
that you trust to keep you safe is actually at risk—even the Vice President does not feel 
safe, so how are ordinary people going to feel safe? 
 Finally, there is a less than subtle attempt to remake and reconstruct normal life 
by introducing an element of terror into everyday activities:  
 
The American people, obviously, if they see something that is suspicious, something out of 
the norm that looks suspicious, they ought to take comfort in knowing our government is 
doing everything we possibly can.  
 
We are getting back to normal. We‘re doing so with a new sense of awareness. And the 
warning that went out today helped heighten that sense of awareness.  
 
Well, Ann, you know, if you find a person that you‘ve never seen before getting in a crop 
duster that doesn‘t belong to you—(laughter)—report it. (Laughter.) If you see suspicious 
people lurking around petrochemical plants, report it to law enforcement. I mean, people 
need to be logical.  
 
And so I would urge my fellow Americans, obviously, if they see something suspicious, 
abnormal, something that looks threatening, report it to local law enforcement.
33
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Significantly, there is no real explanation of what might be ‗out of the norm‘ or what 
might constitute something ‗suspicious‘; instead, the listeners are told that it should be 
‗obvious‘ and are urged to be ‗logical‘, as if this is an entirely reasonable request. This is 
a way of normalising a terrified society and maintaining a never ending emotional roller 
coaster of fear and reassurance. In this manner, the language constructs a ubiquitous and 
endless emergency in which the state must be relied upon (apart from when it too cowers 
in a bunker) to safeguard the nation. 
 
The Dangerous Terrorist Enemy Within 
 
As if the new world of terror created by the authorities was not enough to spread panic 
throughout the community, officials then go to great lengths to explain how these same 
terrorists (who are eager to kill millions of innocent civilians and who possess weapons 
of mass destruction or who have allied with states that possess such weapons) are actually 
highly sophisticated, cunning, and extremely dangerous killers living among us. In a 
series of constructions which sit uneasily with their simultaneous depiction as cowards, 
crazed fanatics, evildoers, and faceless villains, the terrorists are made out to be 
formidable and frightening foes.  
 Of course, there would be no advantage for officials to admit that terrorists are 
ordinary people and frequently incompetent. Instead, the authorities make terrorists out to 
be incredibly sophisticated and fearsome agents—super-terrorists, as it were. For 
example, Ashcroft stated that the September 11 attacks proved that ‗terrorism is the 
activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated and well financed organizations and 
networks‘.34 In the same speech, he suggests that these terrorists ‗can kill thousands of 
Americans in a single day‘ (as if they are that skilled and can do it anytime they choose), 
they can mount ‗sophisticated terrorists operations‘, and they have the ‗capacity to inflict 
damage on the citizens and facilities‘ of the United States. Bush echoes this assessment: 
‗Our enemies are resourceful, and they are incredibly ruthless‘.35 The objective is to 
construct a formidable enemy who is so fearsome that only an extraordinary effort will 
defeat them. Again, it is a common discursive strategy: during the cold war, American 
intelligence deliberately over-estimated Soviet capabilities in order to maintain an 
extremely high level of threat that justified massive defence spending. The CIA also 
exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq in the run-up to both the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. 
 There is a second aspect to the construction of the danger terrorists pose. Officials 
stress that in addition to their undoubted skills and abilities, the terrorists are also a vast 
army of agents spread right across the globe—much like the huge network of Soviet 
agents that operated around the world during the cold war. Soon after September 11, 
2001, for example, Bush revealed: ‗There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 
60 countries. They […] hide in countries around the world‘.36 Given the proximity to the 
attacks, this was a terrifying scenario: after all, if only 19 hijackers could cause such 
massive destruction, how much more death and mayhem could ‗thousands‘ of ruthless 
terrorists cause? A short time later, Bush raises the level of threat even higher by 
suggesting that ‗There are al Qaeda organizations in, roughly, 68 countries‘.37 In one of 
the more detailed articulations of the threat posed by these ubiquitous terrorists, Bush 
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constructs a narrative which could have come directly from the pages of a popular spy 
novel, such as Nelson DeMille‘s The Charm School: 
 
Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in 
Afghanistan‘s camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous 
killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now 
spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning. […] A 
terrorist underworld […] operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of 
large cities.
38
 
 
Here we have a series of images straight out of popular fiction: ‗ticking time bombs‘ 
(they were called ‗sleepers‘ during the cold war) just waiting for that phone call to 
activate them; tens of thousands of agents ‗schooled in the methods of murder‘; and a 
vast ‗terrorist underworld‘ of secret codes, tradecraft, plots and conspiracies that stretches 
right around the world.  
 Interestingly, in the 1970s and 1980s, western security agencies created and 
encouraged a popular mythology surrounding Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, a.k.a. ‗Carlos the 
Jackal‘ (the name itself is an integral part of the myth), which suggested he was a kind of 
super-terrorist of exceptional cunning and skills who was personally involved in virtually 
every major terrorist incident in western Europe at this time. Many works of popular 
fiction and movies were modelled on his story, such as Robert Ludlum‘s The Bourne 
Identity and Nelson DeMille‘s The Lion’s Game. In actuality, as investigator David 
Yallop discovered, Carlos was rather incompetent and relied on good fortune and the 
incompetence of the security services for many of his escapes and successful 
operations.
39
 The case of the Unabomber is similarly instructive: despite the fact his 
‗embarrassingly ineffectual‘ letter bombs resulted in only three fatalities over nearly two 
decades of trying (hardly even comparable to some convenience store robberies), law 
enforcement officials (and the media) constructed him as a major terrorist of mythical 
proportions and spent over $50 million trying to apprehend him.
40
 At the same time, these 
discursive constructions of mythical individual super-terrorists were frequently subsumed 
into a much larger myth of a global Soviet conspiracy during the cold war, where all 
international terrorism was directed by Moscow and communist agents lurked 
everywhere waiting for an opportunity to strike. Carlos the Jackal was popularly believed 
to have been trained in Moscow, for example. Claire Sterling‘s book The Terror Network 
(1981) was the formative work in the promulgation of this myth, and was highly praised 
by Ronald Reagan, Alexander Haig, William Casey and other senior American officials. 
It was only later it was discovered that Sterling‘s work was based on deliberate CIA 
disinformation.
41
 Today, as we can see in the language of American and British officials, 
a similar myth is currently being constructed around Islamic terrorism: every terrorist 
attack is said to be the work of al Qaeda; they are thought to be operating at will in 
virtually every country; they are considered to be highly trained and sophisticated; they 
are, according the authorities, the super-terrorists of the terrorist underworld.  
 As if the threat could not be greater (tens of thousands of highly trained killers 
lurking everywhere, plotting to deploy weapons of mass destruction in our cities in an 
insane attempt to kill millions of us and end our way of life), the final curtain of fear is 
drawn across our terrified imaginations: the threat is not confined to enemies outside the 
borders of the community, it is already inside—it resides within. As Bush put it, there is a 
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need to ‗give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at 
home‘.42 This language is designed to reinforce the idea that ‗the home‘, a place of 
comfort and security, has been invaded and infected by the scourge of terrorism. Ashcroft 
constructs it even more forcefully:  
 
The men and women of justice and law enforcement are called on to combat a terrorist 
threat that is both immediate and vast; a threat that resides here, at home, but whose 
supporters, patrons and sympathizers form a multinational network of evil. The attacks of 
September 11 were acts of terrorism against America orchestrated and carried out by 
individuals living within our borders. […] They live in our communities—plotting, 
planning and waiting to kill Americans again.
43
 
 
Again, there is a reference to the ‗home‘ being violated. This is deliberately emotive 
language, as the threat to the home touches upon some of our deepest cultural 
insecurities. In the same speech, Ashcroft articulates the implications of constructing this 
dangerous ‗enemy within‘: 
 
To date, our anti-terrorism offensive has arrested or detained nearly 1,000 individuals as 
part of the September 11 terrorism investigation. Those who violated the law remain in 
custody. Taking suspected terrorists in violation of the law off the streets and keeping them 
locked up is our clear strategy to prevent terrorism within our borders. […] The federal 
government cannot fight this reign of terror alone. Every American must help us defend 
our nation against this enemy.
44
 
  
There are two clear logics here. First, the ‗enemy within‘ (anyone suspected of being 
linked to terrorism) must be quarantined and isolated from the general population—taken 
off the streets and locked up—and second, every true American must join the fight to 
secure the ‗homeland‘. In this way, the language normalises both the preventive detention 
of thousands of suspected Muslims and the creation of informant-based systems like the 
Responsible Cooperators Program and the Terrorism Information and Prevention System 
program (TIPS). In short, just like the American ‗red scares‘ of the past, the discourse of 
danger is deployed to create social fear, enforce social discipline, mute dissent and 
increase the powers of the national security state. Writing a dangerous enemy that lives 
among the community makes it easier to make policies that serve a wider range of goals 
than just counter-terrorism.  
 Discourses are more than just words or texts however; they are also actions and 
material practices which act as symbols and message transmitters. In constructing the 
‗war on terrorism‘, American officials engaged in a constant display of actions designed 
to reinforce the language of threat. For example, during times of national alert, it is well-
known that Vice President Cheney is always taken to a secure bunker so the continuity of 
government can be maintained in case of an attack on the President. This kind of action 
sends a powerful subliminal message that the government really believes it is in danger of 
being decapitated, and that even the most powerful people in the country are not safe 
from terrorists. Other powerful discursive actions seen so far in the war on terrorism 
include: the grounding of passenger flights to America; the placement of armed sky 
marshals on passenger planes; the flying of jet fighters over major cities during 
heightened alert; the massive steel and concrete barricades erected around public 
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buildings; military operations where tanks and other heavy equipment are displayed 
around airports or at other public venues; large-scale public health exercises that simulate 
a WMD attack on an urban area; massive public safety campaigns for trains; government 
websites that encourage the building of sealed rooms and the hoarding of essential 
supplies; and the institutionalisation of a national terrorist warning system based on the 
colours red, orange, yellow, blue and green (where red signifies extreme risk of terrorist 
attack and green signifies low risk). These are very powerful discursive actions that 
reinforce the seriousness of the threat and send an unambiguous message: if the 
government takes this kind of action, then the threat must indeed be ‗real‘  as no 
government would expend these kinds of resources on a ‗fake‘ or imaginary threat. The 
use of the colour coded warning system is particularly insidious, because the subliminal 
message of danger is reinforced at every intersection, reflected in the glow of the traffic 
lights.  
 
The Politics of Threat and Danger 
 
The primary function of the terrorist threat narrative is to socially construct the counter-
violence of the war on terrorism. An increasing number of studies have demonstrated 
how discourses of fear and threat to the community are an essential element in 
constructing large-scale political violence, particularly war which requires widespread 
social support.
45
 The process of threat creation has been a noticeable feature of every civil 
war in the last decade. In the Balkans, Slobodan Milosevic convinced the Serbian people 
that their culture, their way of life, and their very existence was under threat from Croats 
and Bosnians; this led many to join the war to defend the Serb nation and many more to 
acquiesce or support it tacitly.
46
 In effect, the fear and sense of threat generated in these 
societies was sufficient to motivate ordinary people to engage in or support pre-emptive 
military attacks on their perceived enemies. A similar process has occurred in the ‗war on 
terrorism‘: the construction of fear and a powerful sense of danger have justified pre-
emptive attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, being widely supported by a terrified 
population. 
 The politics of fear has another vital political function: constructing and 
sustaining collective identity. It is well known that individuals unify in the face of an 
external danger in an instinctual psychological reflex. For sizeable and diverse 
collectivities such as states, the existence of abiding and multiple exogenous threats is 
indispensable for bolstering the unity of the ‗imagined community‘. While neo-realist 
scholars believe that the international system is by definition dangerous and 
threatening—providing all states with a pre-existing and permanent external danger—
constructivists have shown how state practices actually constitute or create this situation 
of anarchy through their interaction.
47
 External threats do not necessarily exist 
independently of states; rather, states deliberately construct them for the purposes of 
disciplining the domestic sphere. Creating and maintaining a perennial ‗discourse of 
danger‘ therefore, is a key function of foreign policy, designed to enforce inside/outside, 
self/other boundaries and thereby construct or ‗write‘ collective identity.48 Typically, 
states construct external threats by positing a rival state (the ‗evil‘ Soviet empire, for 
example), an opposing ideology (fascism, communism or Islamic fundamentalism), or 
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‗national security‘ issues such as weapons proliferation, rogue states, illicit drugs, and 
terrorism.  
 In addition to constructing counter-terrorist violence and enforcing collective 
identity, there are other reasons authorities value the creation of social anxiety and moral 
panics. In the first place, it can be an effective means of de-legitimising dissent and 
muting criticism. In an atmosphere of national peril, the appeal for unity takes on greater 
moral force and voicing disagreement can be seen as an act of disloyalty. In many cases, 
the creation of widespread moral panics can lead to ordinary citizens acting as the 
primary agents of censure themselves, both in terms of self-censorship (choosing to 
withhold their own doubts and disagreements in public discourse) and the censorship of 
others (expressing disapproval when confronted with dissenting or ‗disloyal‘ opinions in 
others). There have been countless cases of this phenomenon in America since the ‗war 
on terrorism‘ began, from the sacking of injudicious talk show hosts, to the public 
burning of Dixie Chicks CDs and the banning of ‗unpatriotic‘ t-shirts worn by high 
school students.  
 Related to this, there are a great many vested interests among government 
agencies in maintaining a sense of national peril; the security agencies in particular—
police, FBI, CIA, NSA, Department of Homeland Security, MI5 and MI6 in Britain—
receive increased resources and enjoy an elevated status in times of national danger. As 
Senator Arthur Vandeburg advised President Truman, if you really want all the weapons 
and taxes to pay for a long war against communism, then you had better ‗scare hell out of 
the American people‘.49 In the ‗war on terrorism‘, all of the national security 
institutions—the military, law enforcement agencies, emergency response agencies and 
intelligence organisations—have received massive extra funding directly because of the 
fear of terrorist attacks. In America, more than half of the federal budget for FY 2004 was 
devoted to national defence, with the Pentagon receiving $399 billion and spending on 
homeland security more than doubling from $18 billion to $38 billion.
50
 With agencies 
like the CIA costing around $30 billion per year, the sums involved are truly vast. In 
Britain, MI5 has recently been given a 50 percent increase in its budget to £300 million 
per year and is set to increase its personnel numbers to the highest level since World War 
II.
51
 In addition to these public bodies, there are also private sector interests in the 
maintenance of social fear; private security providers have benefited greatly from the 
state of anxiety about terrorism and the sector is thriving with sales of security equipment 
topping $50 billion per annum in the last few years.
52
 There are direct material benefits 
for a great many government actors—as well as prestige and standing—in maintaining an 
elevated level of public fear. 
 Another function of social fear is the distraction of the public from more complex 
and pressing social ills. Actually, some fears are better than others for politicians, because 
some fears—such as the fear of being without health care or employment—are not 
amenable to quick-fix solutions and carry the risk of policy failure. The fear of terrorism 
on the other hand, is perfect for the authorities because it is ubiquitous, catastrophic, 
opaque (reliant on government control of secret information) and rooted in deep cultural 
anxieties. Moreover, there is little risk for the authorities of being seen to fail; every 
terrorist attack can simply be construed as another reason to expend even greater 
resources in dealing with the threat—rather than as a failure of current policies. As a 
consequence, more pressing and more complex threats to individual safety, such as crime, 
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gun control, poverty, workplace safety and health (to name a few), can remain relatively 
neglected while the government spends hundreds of billions of dollars on the more 
pressing threat of terrorism. A suffocating smokescreen of fear is required for this 
strategy to work successfully. When it does, it also allows for the diversion of scarce 
resources into ideologically driven political projects, such as National Missile Defence, 
military expansion, and cutting welfare programmes. 
 Lastly, fear creates calls for retaliation and punishment. Studies have shown that 
the more fearful people are of crime, for example, the more punitive they require the 
authorities to be towards criminals.
53
 The atmosphere of retribution gives the authorities 
greater freedom to use coercive and repressive strategies and to exercise ‗raw power‘. 
This is the principle currently at work in the construction of the ‗war on terrorism‘: create 
enough fear and anxiety about the threat posed by terrorism and people will fully support 
a massive campaign of punitive violence against terrorists and the states that support 
them. They will also accept limitations on their own human rights and civil liberties as 
part of the cost of punishing terrorists. In part, the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal was 
caused by the dread of the terrifying terrorist ‗other‘; being the object of such fear (and 
hatred) led directly to harsher treatment. It is also the reason there has been a massive 
increase in the incidence of hate crimes against Muslims and people of Arab appearance 
in America and Britain; the moral panic constructed by the authorities has turned 
Muslims into the feared (and hated) ‗other‘.  
   
Deconstructing the Discourse of Fear 
 
There is no doubting the power of the current discourse of threat and danger; it appears to 
hold hegemonic sway over both public and private discourse. However, I would argue 
that the primary discursive constructions at the heart of the threat narrative are actually 
inherently unstable and vulnerable to deconstruction across a range of levels. A first 
strategy of deconstruction lies in revealing the underlying political purposes of the 
discourse, as I have attempted to do in the paper so far: revealing the hegemonic forces at 
work in the public language of counter-terrorism helps to de-invest it of its assumed 
moral authority. A second strategy involves marshalling counter-evidence and counter-
arguments that contradict the primary narratives or provide alternative accounts. In this 
regard, there are a great many areas in which the central discursive constructions are 
vulnerable. While not comprehensive in any stretch of the imagination, the following 
arguments provide a powerful rebuttal to the continuous public reproduction of the 
terrorist threat. 
 In the first place, it is possible to demonstrate that the actual risk posed by 
terrorism to personal and public safety is actually minute: in statistical terms the risk of 
being killed in a terrorist attack ranks somewhere near the risk of being killed by DIY 
accidents, lightning strikes, or bee stings.
54
 Certainly, it does not even begin to compare 
America‘s annual death toll from gun violence: since 1965 close to a million Americans 
have died from gunshot wounds, and in 2000 a total of 28,117 people died in weapons-
related incidents—more than 10,000 of whom were murdered.55 Even in 2001, America‘s 
worst year on record, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by 
deaths from automobile accidents and pedestrian deaths, alcohol and tobacco-related 
illnesses, suicides, and a great many diseases like influenza, cancer, rabies, and liver 
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disease. At a global level, the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths from terrorism pales 
into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, the 500,000 
people who are killed every year by light weapons, the 2 million who are killed around 
the world in automobile accidents, and the millions who die annually from diseases like 
influenza (3.9 million annual deaths), HIV-AIDS (2.9 million annual deaths), diarrhoeal 
(2.1 million annual deaths), and tuberculosis (1.7 million annual deaths).
56
 The United 
Nations recently estimated that 150,000 people die every year from increased diseases 
caused by global warming; Dr David King, Britain‘s chief scientist has suggested that 
global warming is really a much greater threat to humanity than terrorism.
57
 In Britain, 
around 5,000 people a year die in the NHS from MRSA caused by the lack of hygiene. 
 A study of the location and nature of terrorist attacks themselves further confirms 
the view that terrorism actually poses a negligible risk to the personal safety of 
Americans or Europeans—among others. In geographical terms, the vast majority of 
terrorist attacks occur in a very small number of countries—Israel, Russia, Colombia, 
Kashmir, Algeria, Afghanistan, and since May 2003, Iraq. Terrorism, in other words, is 
almost always associated with a relatively small number of ongoing political conflicts; 
the vast majority of the world‘s 200 or so states experience little or no terrorism at all. 
The nature of terrorist attacks reveals a similar kind of picture: proportionally, most 
terrorist violence is directed at property rather than persons and the majority of attacks 
involve few or no fatalities at all. For example, of the 50 terrorist incidents reported for 
the entire Latin American region in 2003, 41 of them were bombings of an American-
owned oil pipeline in Colombia.
58
 Significantly, of the more than 10,000 terrorist 
incidents between 1968 and 1998, fewer than a dozen involved more than 100 fatalities.
59
 
Overall, the number of terrorist attacks world-wide has been stable or falling for some 
time.
60
 The random mass casualty terrorism that we are constantly told to expect is 
actually extremely rare. This is because, as one terrorism expert put it, ‗terrorists want a 
lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead‘.61 Mass casualties are often counter-
productive to terrorist aims—they alienate their supporters and can provoke harsh 
reprisals from the authorities—, as well as being unnecessary—a phoned in bomb threat 
is usually sufficient to cause widespread panic. In reality, most terrorist violence is 
directed at symbolic targets; its aim is to create a media spectacle in order to 
communicate some kind of political message. It is instrumental violence, or ‗propaganda 
of the deed‘. 
 There are also counter-arguments about whether there really is a ‗new‘ form of 
‗catastrophic terrorism‘, and whether terrorists really would as a matter of course, employ 
weapons of mass destruction. A number of academics have put forward reasons for 
thinking the vast majority of terrorists unlikely to ever use such weapons.
62
 Apart from 
the difficulties of obtaining and deploying such weapons (they are notoriously unstable 
and unpredictable), there are real dangers that such attacks would be counter productive, 
would undermine support and distort the terrorist‘s political message, and would 
probably invite overwhelming retaliation. Terrorists are rational actors and are acutely 
aware of these dangers. Interviews with senior al Qaeda figures for example, reveal that 
they rejected using WMD on September 11, 2001 for precisely these kinds of reasons. 
From this perspective, it is a massive (and deliberate) over-inflation of the threat. In truth, 
even nation-states with all their resources would find it extremely difficult to achieve 
what these terrorists are supposed to be capable of. The only country to have ever 
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detonated an atomic weapon in a city—America at Hiroshima—failed to kill ‗millions‘ of 
innocent people. 
 Most revealing in this regard, the Gilmore Commission in 1999, a Clinton-
appointed advisory panel that was assembled to investigate the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction falling into the hands of terrorists concluded in its final report that ‗rogue 
states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because of the likelihood that 
such a group‘s actions might be unpredictable even to the point of using the weapon 
against its sponsor‘; in addition, they would be reluctant to use such weapons themselves 
due to ‗the prospect of significant reprisals‘.63 This is a perspective shared by no small 
number of scholars: it is too risky for any state to entrust unaccountable groups of 
dissidents and terrorists with such weapons. Condoleeza Rice, a key figure in the Bush 
administration, appears to have shared this view when she was a practising academic: in 
2000 she wrote that there was no need to panic about rogue states because ‗if they do 
acquire WMD—their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will 
bring national obliteration‘.64 
 The discursive construction of thousands of highly sophisticated al Qaeda 
operatives around the world just waiting to strike can also be deconstructed as nothing 
more than myth-making. As described above, individual terrorists almost never reach the 
level of cunning and sophistication that officials ascribe to them. Information gathered 
since September 11, 2001 reveals that the characterisation of the al Qaeda terrorists as 
brilliant professionals—the so-called ‗superman scenario‘—is misconstrued. In fact, they 
made a great many amateurish errors and only avoided detection and interception through 
profound failures in the American intelligence system.
65
 Moreover, in relation to the 
mythology now surrounding al Qaeda, it has been convincingly shown that the idea of a 
global Islamic terrorist organisation similar to the mafia, with Osama bin Laden at the 
head, is a fiction that was first advocated by the US Justice Department in the aftermath 
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. To the extent that al Qaeda operated a number 
of camps on the fringes of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1990s, this 
rudimentary level of organisation was destroyed in December 2001 with the fall of the 
Taliban regime.
66
 While there are extremist Islamic groups operating locally and 
autonomously in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, Egypt, The 
Philippines, and Yemen, they are for the most part fighting over locally-defined issues; 
the idea that they are unified in a global struggle against modernity and western values is 
a highly Eurocentric and misleading exaggeration. It is designed to construct a global 
Islamic conspiracy of sinister proportions, and is directly comparable to the cold war 
mythology of a global communist conspiracy that was also a deliberate obfuscation. 
 Finally, even the most cursory knowledge of previous terrorist groups reveals that 
they have never truly threatened a state, or democracy, or freedom, or the way of life of 
an entire people; nor have they ever threatened the peace of the world or the existence of 
any civilisation. This is so much demagoguery. On the other hand, there are numerous 
examples where the reaction of the authorities to terrorist attacks has endangered 
democracy and freedom by withdrawing civil and political rights, and where the state‘s 
eagerness to suppress dissidents has led to miscarriages of justice and human rights 
abuses by the security forces. In reality, it is not terrorism that threatens the essence of 
our societies—terrorists are tiny groups of desperate people able to do little more than 
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commit symbolic acts of violence—but rather state-led counter-terrorism and the dangers 
of over-reaction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discourse of fear is one of the central constructions of the war on terrorism. Its main 
result is a society living in a state of ‗ontological hysteria‘—a nation constantly 
anticipating the next attack, just ‗waiting for terror‘.67. The suffocating power of the 
counter-terrorism project derives in large part from its ability to project a reality of 
ubiquitous and impending danger. And yet, as I have demonstrated, the discursive 
construction of the catastrophic terrorist threat is inherently unstable and susceptible to 
counter-hegemonic resistance. If the terrorist threat is a social construction, there is no 
reason why it cannot be deconstructed. 
 From an ethical perspective, there are compelling reasons for actively resisting 
and working to dismantle the discourse of threat and danger. In the first place, as a great 
many studies have shown, the social construction of the global terrorist threat has 
functioned to provide a discursive smokescreen for the pursuit of expansionist imperial 
policies, such as opening up new regions to American markets and influence, the 
expansion of a global military presence, the disciplining of potential rivals, and the 
strategic control of future oil supplies—among others.68 In effect, the terrorist threat 
presently fulfils the same ideological and discursive functions that the communist threat 
played during the cold war.  
 Second, the discourse of threat and danger is cynically employed to de-legitimise 
domestic dissent and expanding state power through the reassertion of the national 
security state. Successive reports by Amnesty International have noted that this is 
occurring all over the world: the war on terror is being used to repress opponents in 
dozens of countries.
69
 In this regard, the politics of fear are proving highly damaging to 
democratic politics and the functioning of civil society. The corrosive effects of the 
discourse are plainly obvious: anti-globalisation protesters, academics, postmodernists, 
liberals, pro-choice activists, environmentalists and gay liberationists in America have 
been accused of being aligned with the evil of terrorism and of undermining the nation‘s 
struggle against terrorism;
70
 arms trade protesters are arrested under anti-terrorism 
legislation in Britain; blacklists of ‗disloyal‘ professors, university departments, 
journalists, writers and commentators are posted on the internet and smear campaigns are 
launched against them; anti-administration voices are kept away from speaking at public 
events or in the media; and political opponents of government policy are accused of being 
traitors. The overall effect of this process is the narrowing of the discursive space for 
political debate and the suppression of civil society. 
 However, the most compelling reason for opposing the discourse of threat and 
danger is that it is directly implicated in the very worst of the abuses of the global 
counter-terrorism effort—from the mass murder of Taliban prisoners during Operation 
Enduring Freedom, to the illegal rendition of terrorist suspects and the ongoing murder, 
torture, and inhumane treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Baghram air-force 
base, Abu Ghraib prison, and countless other detention facilities around the world.
71
 
Recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that these large-scale and systematic 
abuses of human rights, far from being aberrant or in any way exceptional, have instead 
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been normalised and institutionalised in the day-to-day prosecution of the war on 
terrorism.
72
  
 More importantly, the studies clearly demonstrate that the abuses were the direct 
result of the creation of a supreme and ubiquitous terrorist threat. For example, the 
extreme forms of shackling seen in the photos of the initial Guantanamo Bay prisoners 
(in some cases, bound and shackled to gurneys, detainees were wheeled to interrogations) 
were justified on the grounds that these were such dangerous individuals that they had to 
be restrained in this fashion for the safety of those guarding them.
73
 Earlier, President 
Bush‘s Military Order of November 13, 2001 proclaimed that detainees in the war on 
terrorism were not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions and would be 
tried under special military commissions because: 
 
Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the 
capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States 
that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive 
destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United 
States Government. […] Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, 
injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against 
the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an 
extraordinary emergency exists for national defence purposes…74 (emphasis added.) 
 
Later, in dozens of letters and memos regarding the treatment of prisoners, senior 
officials argue that ‗the interrogation of such unlawful combatants in a manner beyond 
that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions‘75 (emphasis added) will be allowable because: 
 
al Qaeda has other sleeper cells within the United States that may be planning… to develop 
and deploy chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Under these 
circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could enable the United States to 
prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their 
magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to 
insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could 
take hundreds or thousands of lives.
76
 (emphasis added.) 
 
Apart from revealing how far the public language of the war on terrorism has permeated 
the institutions of government and state security, what these excerpts clearly demonstrate 
is how the discursive construction of the terrorist threat has been deployed to justify and 
normalise the systematic and institutional abuse of human rights.  
 In sum, the discourse of threat and danger is proving to be highly damaging to 
both our moral values and our political life; in the process, individuals are being violated, 
abused, and killed. We are implicated in this monstrosity as citizens, and fail in our 
academic responsibilities, if we remain silent and do not act. As Campbell has expressed 
it, ‗to live ethically, we must think and act politically.‘77 For this reason, we have an 
ethical duty to resist the politics of fear, to counter and oppose it at every opportunity, 
and to continually interrogate the exercise of state power currently masquerading as the 
war on terrorism. 
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